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ABSTRACT 
 
Copyright management information (CMI), defined by the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), is information 
conveyed with a copyrighted work that identifies the owner 
and nature of that copyright. Although the DMCA prohibits 
the knowing removal of CMI under 17 U.S.C. § 1202(b), 
district court decisions relating to CMI are split on whether 
its provisions apply only to digital forms or also extend to 
non-digital CMI conveyance. This Article describes the 
current state of CMI jurisprudence and the expected effects of 
possible interpretive outcomes.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (the Act) protects copy-
right management information (CMI) placed by a copyright’s owner. 
The Act generally defines CMI as “information conveyed in 
connection with [copyrighted works] . . . including in digital form,” 
that identifies the owner and nature of the copyright itself.1
Earlier CMI-related decisions split between two interpretive 
camps. The narrower interpretation construed CMI protection strictly 
within the context of the Act’s overarching legislative purpose. It 
therefore limited CMI protection to digital measures, such as 
copyright information embedded in software as a part of a larger 
digital rights management (DRM) system.
 However, 
the statutory wording leaves open questions about whether the 
protections are specific to digital CMI in digital media, digitally 
created CMI in either digital or analog media, or all CMI in media.  
2
Two recent district court decisions, McClatchey v. Associated 
Press
 Other courts favored a 
broader approach and were willing to expand the CMI protection 
beyond digitally stored CMI to digitally placed CMI, such as digitally 
embedded watermarks in printed photos. Courts following the latter 
approach avoided foreclosing the Act’s applicability to entirely 
analog CMI.  
3 and Associated Press v. All Headline News,4
                                                                                                         
1  17 U.S.C. § 1202(c) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 endorse an even 
broader interpretation of the Act’s CMI provisions. Both decisions 
explicitly extend the reach of the Act’s CMI provisions beyond 
digital forms of transmission or conveyance to fully analog CMI 
manifestations. This interpretation has potentially significant effects 
2  See, e.g., IQ Group v. Wiesner, 409 F. Supp. 2d 587 (D.N.J. 2006). 
3  McClatchey v. Associated Press, No. 3:05-cv-145 (Johnstown), 2007 WL 
776103 (W.D. Pa. March 9, 2007). 
4  Associated Press v. All Headline News, 608 F. Supp 454 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
2
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on copyright enforcement, some of which are detailed below. 
Absent an authoritative Supreme Court opinion, the split remains. 
This Article surveys these cases, formulates a unified picture of the 
Act’s CMI protections, and concludes with practical suggestions on 
how to best assess the validity of a CMI claim under the Act. 
 
I.THE DMCA AND CMI 
 
The Act is a statutory implementation of two treaties with the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO): the WIPO 
Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms 
Treaty, both signed in 1996.5 The Act broadly addresses the protec-
tion of digital production and dissemination of copyrighted 
technological and technologically created works.6 Two of the Act’s 
many mandates are protection against circumvention of technological 
copyright measures7 and preservation of CMI.8
Sections 1201 and 1202, known as the “anti-circumvention” 
provisions, are the codification of Articles 11 and 12 of the 1996 
WIPO Copyright Treaty, which requires parties to “provide adequate 
legal protection . . . against the circumvention of effective 
technological measures that are used by authors in connection with 
the exercise of their rights”
 The former, codified 
in § 1201, targets a specific class of devices and services, but § 1202, 
dealing with CMI, only imposes liability for certain acts. 
9 and to provide “effective legal remedies 
against any person knowingly . . . remov[ing] or alter[ing] any 
electronic rights management information without authority.”10
                                                                                                         
5  See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining “international agreement” as including 
the WTO Agreement, the WIPO Copyright Treaty, and the WIPO Performances 
and Phonograms Treaty). 
 The 
treaty itself is notable because it specifically mentions the protection 
of electronic rights management.  
6  S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 2 (1998); see also MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID 
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12A.02(B)(1) (Rev. Ed. 2010). 
7  17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006). 
8  Id. § 1202. 
9  World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty art. 11, Dec. 20, 
1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17, 36 I.L.M. 65 [hereinafter WIPO Copyright 
Treaty]. 
10  Id. art. 12 para. 1. 
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The language in §§ 1201 and 1202 differs subtly from that of the 
treaty. Subject to several incidental exceptions, § 1201 bans the 
“circumvent[ion of] technological measure[s] that effectively control 
access” to protected works.11
 
 Like the remainder of the Act, the 
section specifically addresses “technological measures,” not other 
measures more broadly covered by general copyright doctrine. This 
language reflects Article 11. However, § 1202, which covers CMI 
and implements Article 12, contains no such wording. Courts 
disagree whether CMI, as protected by § 1202, must be by definition 
a “technological measure” within the meaning of § 1201 or whether 
the textual exclusion of technological requirements implies a broader 
definition. This Article analyzes whether these two provisions should 
be read in isolation or together as a broader statutory scheme. 
II. CMI’S POSSIBLE MEANINGS UNDER THE DMCA 
 
Section 1202 protects eight distinct categories of information as 
CMI, if used “in connection with copies . . . performances or displays 
of a work.” The categories include: (1) the work’s title; (2) its author; 
(3) its copyright owner; (4) names of performers in non-audiovisual; 
non-broadcast work; (5) names of writers, performers, and directors 
in audiovisual, non-broadcast work; (6) terms and conditions for the 
work’s use; (7) links, numbers, or codes referring to CMI; and (8) any 
additional data properly added to the definition by administratively 
promulgated regulation.12
Data belonging to any of these categories may not be removed, 
altered, or falsified if they are conveyed in conjunction with a copied 
work.
  
13 Data not falling into one of § 1202’s eight CMI categories is 
not protected under the Act’s provisions but may be subject to other 
laws, such as unfair trade.14 Section 1202 claims require both intent 
to remove or alter the CMI and a showing of actual infringement 
resulting from the removal or alteration.15
                                                                                                         
11  17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006). 
 Violations of § 1202 are 
12  Id. § 1202(c). 
13 Id. § 1202(a) and (b). 
14  S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 16 (1998); see also NIMMER, supra note 6, at § 
12A.09[A]. 
15  JAY DRATLER, JR., CYBERLAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE DIGITAL 
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punishable by actual and fixed statutory damages under § 1203.16 
Criminal penalties apply to willful and commercially exploitative 
violators.17
The debate about whether CMI protected by § 1202 must be a 
“technological measure” centers on § 1202’s inapt wording and 
poorly documented legislative history. Section 1202 contains no 
mention of other Act-created provisions and includes the phrase 
“including in digital form” when defining CMI for the purpose of 
§ 1202. This implies that § 1202’s definitions have a broader reach 
than merely that of the technological realm.  
 
Because it is part of the Act, it is also possible to read § 1202 to 
target only technological copyright protection methods and digital 
methods of conveying CMI. This would rule out a broader inter-
pretation including traditional copyright management, such as 
copyright notices in textbooks. The Act was enacted with the stated 
goal of creating “the legal platform for launching the global digital 
on-line marketplace for copyrighted works” and to “make digital 
networks safe places to disseminate and exploit copyright mate-
rials.”18
 
 It would follow that the Act’s provisions should be inter-
preted in the context of its legislative purpose. The first courts to 
consider the issue espoused this context-sensitive view. 
III. DMCA CONTEXT-SENSITIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF CMI 
 
In 2006, a New Jersey district court provided the first detailed 
interpretation of § 1202 in IQ Group v. Wiesner.19
                                                                                                         
MILLENNIUM § 4.03 (2000). 
 In IQ Group, the 
defendant, Wiesner Publications, redistributed an online adver-
tisement for a client shared with the plaintiff, IQ Group. In so doing, 
it removed an embedded logo belonging to the plaintiff and replaced 
it with its own. The court considered the breadth of § 1202’s 
coverage in light of its statutory construction, the state of juris-
prudence within the copyright field, and the statute’s legislative 
16  17 U.S.C. § 1203(c) (2006) (note that both § 1201 and § 1202 are 
mentioned directly). 
17  Id. § 1204(a). 
18  S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 2 (1998). 
19  IQ Group v. Wiesner, 409 F. Supp. 2d 587 (D.N.J. 2006). 
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history.  
Though it conceded that a literal reading of the statute implied a 
broad application, the court determined that the statute should be 
subject to a “narrowing interpretation”20 that only protects CMI 
functioning “as a component of an automated copyright protection or 
management system.”21 The court held that § 1202 should not be 
“construed to cover copyright management performed by people, 
which is covered by the Copyright Act.”22
The court reasoned that while authors traditionally used copyright 
law to protect their legal rights, modern technological measures have 
increasingly displaced law in controlling access to works. It noted 
that the purpose of the Act was to protect those technological 
measures rather than the copyrights themselves.
 Under this standard, the 
court found insufficient evidence that the logo served as a component 
of automated copyright protection or management and granted 
summary judgment to the defendants. 
23 It found support for 
this view in the working papers of the executively mandated Working 
Group on Intellectual Property Rights, which drafted the largely 
unchanged language of legislation now known as §§ 1201 and 
1202.24 The report giving rise to §§ 1201 and 1202, colloquially 
called the “White Paper,” noted that the drafters intended the CMI 
provisions to protect information vital to the implementation of 
automated, digital-copyright management systems.25 The language 
presented in the White Paper passed through Congress with little 
comment and no significant revision prior to enactment, suggesting 
that legislators shared this interpretation.26
                                                                                                         
20  Id. at 593. 
 Finally, the court noted 
that this narrow interpretation made § 1202 consistent with § 1201, as 
21  Id. at 597. 
22  Id. 
23  Id. at 593. See also Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A 
Closer Look at Copyright Management in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981, 984 
(1996). 
24  See id. at 594-97. 
25  WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, executive 
summary (1995), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/doc/ipnii/ 
execsum.html. 
26  IQ Group, 409 F. Supp. 2d. at 596. 
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well as Chapter 12 as a whole. 
About one year later, a California district court largely followed 
IQ Group’s reasoning in Textile Secrets v. Ya-Ya, though it reached a 
somewhat less definitive conclusion.27 The case involved an 
allegedly copied textile design.28 The plaintiff, Textile Secrets, 
registered a copyright for a textile of its own design. The defendant, a 
high-end clothing designer named Ya-Ya Brand Inc., had allegedly 
taken sample yardage of the fabric provided by the plaintiff and 
incorporated it into its own clothing after removing tags indicating 
the design’s registered ownership. Textile Secrets argued that Ya-
Ya’s removal of the tag constituted a violation of § 1202.29
Applying basic principles of statutory construction, the court 
reached a similar initial result to IQ Group and determined that § 
1202 must be construed in light of Chapter 12 as a whole and as a 
part of the Act’s Title I.
 
30 A literal reading, as also noted by IQ 
Group, would result in § 1202’s applicability “wherever any author 
has affixed anything that might refer to his or her name.”31
The Textile Secrets court also assessed the White Paper and 
subsequent legislative history and concurred with IQ Group’s 
narrowed interpretation of § 1202. However, the court noted in  
dictum that it did “not find it necessary to define the scope . . . [as] 
only [applying] to copyright management information that functions 
‘as a component of an automated copyright protection or 
management system.’”
 It found 
this interpretation impracticable within the context of the Act’s 
structure, thus justifying an inquiry into § 1202’s legislative history. 
32 Thus, unlike in IQ Group, the Textile 
Secrets court construed § 1202 as possibly applying to technological 
measures that directly or effectively control access to work, not solely 
to components of automated copyright management systems.33
Both cases interpreted § 1202 narrowly; neither court imputed 
tangible or non-digital forms of copyright information into § 1202’s 
  
                                                                                                         
27  Textile Secrets v. Ya-Ya, 524 F. Supp. 2d 1184 (C.D. Cal. 2007). 
28  Id. at 1188. 
29  Id. at 1192-93. 
30  Id. at 1195. 
31  Id. (quoting IQ Group, 409 F. Supp. 2d at 593). 
32  Id. at 1203, n. 18. 
33  Id. at 1202-03. 
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scope. But the dictum in Textile Secrets was a harbinger for a 
wholesale interpretive change. 
 
IV. BROADER INTERPRETATIONS OF CMI: GENERAL 
APPLICABILITY? 
 
Some recent district court decisions have broadened § 1202’s 
applicability. Shortly after Textile Secrets, the district court of the 
Western District of Pennsylvania held in McClatchey v. Associated 
Press that § 1202 also applies to non-digital information.34
In denying summary judgment for the AP, the court chose to 
interpret § 1202 broadly based on the face of the statute; specifically, 
it pointed to § 1202(c)’s assertion that “copyright management 
information” includes “any” information falling within § 1202’s 
categories, “including in digital form.”
 Plaintiff 
McClatchey took and subsequently registered a copyright for a photo 
of Flight 93’s crash during the events of September 11, 2001. The 
defendant, Associated Press (AP), allegedly redistributed the photo, 
replacing McClatchey’s copyright information with its own.  
35 The court reasoned that to 
“avoid rendering those terms superfluous, the statute must also 
protect non-digital information.”36 It noted that the usage of a 
computer to add copyright management information already 
constitutes the use of a digital or technological device to add CMI.37
The McClatchey court used language in IQ Group to justify its 
position. Part of IQ Group’s test for CMI protection is a determi-
nation of whether the CMI “functioned as a component of an 
automated copyright protection system.”
 
Unlike the IQ Group or Textile Secrets courts, however, the 
McClatchey court took a strictly textual approach to § 1202 inter-
pretation and declined to participate in a detailed analysis of the 
legislative history. 
38
                                                                                                         
34  McClatchey, 2007 WL 776103. 
 Whereas in IQ Group this 
determination was meant to cabin § 1202 strictly to CMI used as part 
of an automated management system, the McClatchey court 
35  Id. at *5. 
36  Id. 
37  Id. 
38  IQ Group v. Wiesner, 409 F. Supp. 2d 587, 597 (D.N.J. 2006). 
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understood this language to encompass the process of using software 
to place copyright information on analog works, such as pictures.39
Another recent case involving CMI also endorsed a broad 
interpretation of § 1202, but rejected IQ Group’s and Textile Secrets’ 
approaches altogether. In 2009, a New York district court in 
Associated Press v. All Headline News found § 1202’s language clear 
enough on its face to bar any inquiry into its legislative history.
 
This construction broadened the reach of § 1202 significantly. 
40 The 
plaintiff, AP sued defendant All Headline News for misappropriating 
news from the AP’s ticker and replacing the AP’s copyright notice 
with its own. The Associated Press court declined to follow the 
rationales of the decisions in IQ Group and Textile Secret, stating that 
Second Circuit rules of statutory construction barred them from 
inquiring into legislative history “‘to cloud statutory text that is clear’ 
even if there are ‘contrary indications in [that] history.’”41 The court 
then used similar logic as the McClatchey court in determining that 
no inquiry into the methods or nature of the CMI removal was 
necessary because the statute plainly contemplated even non-digital 
alteration of analog data to be within its scope.42 Unlike McClatchey, 
however, it found no reason to use language from IQ Group to justify 
its decision, instead reading the statute itself as being applicable to all 
kinds of copyright information, whether analog or digital. It notably 
found no mention of “technological measures of automated systems” 
within the statute itself and thus saw no reason to limit the section’s 
applicability.43
 
 
V. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF § 1202 CONSTRUCTION 
 
It is unclear how this interpretive split will be resolved, though no 
recent trial or appellate court has rejected the textualist approach 
endorsed by McClatchey and Associated Press. A narrow § 1202 
interpretation implies that CMI protection provisions are treated 
separately from general copyright law. A broad § 1202 interpretation, 
                                                                                                         
39  McClatchey, 2007 WL 776103, at *5. 
40  Associated Press v. All Headline News, 608 F. Supp 454 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
41  Id. at 461-62 (quoting Ratzlaf v. U.S., 510 U.S. 135, 147-48 (1994)). 
42  Id. at 462. 
43  Id. 
9
Lim: A Survey of the DMCA's Copyright Management Information Protectio
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2011
306 WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS  [VOL. 6:4 
however, has several important implications not only for the avail-
ability of § 1203 damages, but also for trademark law, copyright law, 
and for CMI process licensees and licensors.  
 
A.   Availability of § 1203 Damages 
 
A broad interpretation of § 1202 would potentially increase the 
availability of § 1203’s statutory damages. The earlier, narrower 
§ 1202 interpretation made it difficult to prove violation and deterred 
plaintiffs without cases clearly involving purely digital CMI from 
attempting to claim § 1203 damages. However, recent courts’ 
willingness to extend § 1202 applicability may significantly increase 
the number of statutory damage claims.44 Such claims, if successful, 
are lucrative. Section 1203 entitles the prevailing party to $2,500 to 
$25,000 per violation, and the few courts that have interpreted 
§ 1203’s meaning of “violation” have generally counted each 
individual impression.45 For works distributed online, the total 
penalty could be astronomical. The threat of such large penalties may 
cause artists and others creating works under fair use to be more 
circumspect about the copyrighted works from which they draw 
inspiration, possibly tilting the litigation balance in favor of copyright 
holders.46
 
 
B.  Relationship Between DMCA CMI Requirements and  
Trademark Law 
 
A § 1202 interpretation broad enough to protect instances of 
copyright protection and not simply automated protection methods 
would pose overlapping trademark concerns. In many instances, CMI 
bears the trademark of the copyright’s owner. A simple example 
                                                                                                         
44  See, e.g., Fred von Lohmann, AP Invokes DMCA Against Obama “Hope” 
Poster Artist, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Mar. 23, 2009), 
http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/03/ap-uses-dmca-intimidate-hope-artist.  
45  17 U.S.C. § 1203(c)(3) (2006); see also Fred von Lohmann, supra note 45. 
46  See, e.g., Sony BMG Music Entertainment v. Tenenbaum, No. 07 Civ. 
11446-NG (D. Mass. July 9, 2010) (district court nullified a large jury award of 
statutory damages on due process grounds, even though the award was statutorily 
valid). 
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would be the placement of a trademarked business name on a printed 
photograph. This poses a dilemma; removal of CMI would violate the 
Act, but retention of CMI in subsequent distribution may violate 
trademark law.47
 
 No court has commented directly on this impasse, 
though Associated Press implied in passing that source citations 
could not be construed as trademark infringement. 
C.  Effects on Copyright Law 
 
If § 1202 is applied to all types of CMI, whether analog, digital, 
manual, or automated, requirements for fair use of copyright 
information could be significantly altered. At the most textual end of 
the spectrum, § 1202 makes no exception for fair use; removal or 
alteration of copyright information is categorically prohibited 
“without the authority of the copyright owner or law.”48
A context-sensitive but still broad reading of § 1202 would 
protect digital or digitally placed CMI in both digital and analog 
works, but not purely analog CMI. Under this approach, a determi-
 Thus, in its 
broadest reading, § 1202 practically requires retention of all previous 
CMI, even for artistic transformations or renditions of existing works, 
whether digital or analog in content or creation. Such an 
interpretation would directly oppose the fair use concept that certain 
types of use do not require the copyright holder’s permission. Any 
failure to retain this CMI is subject to statutory penalties. A possible 
defense, however, is to aver that because fair use is fundamentally not 
infringement, the removal of CMI, whether or not intentional, cannot 
lead to actual infringement. Thus, one required element of a § 1202 
claim would be unfulfilled. 
                                                                                                         
47  See Eric Goldman, AP Enforcement Action Against Syndicator Survives 
Dismissal Motion--AP v. All Headline News, TECHNOLOGY AND MARKETING LAW 
BLOG (Feb. 19, 2009), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2009/02/ 
ap_enforcement.htm. But see Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 
539 U.S. 23 (2003) (holding that Lanham Act claims for false designation of origin 
are barred if the copyrighted work in question becomes part of the public domain). 
48  See, e.g., David Johnson, Court Split Widens over Whether DMCA Rules 
against Removal of Copyright Management Information Apply Only to Automatic, 
Computerized Copyright Management Systems, DAVID JOHNSON’S DIGITAL MEDIA 
LAWYER BLOG (Mar. 25, 2009), http://www.digitalmedialawyerblog.com/2009/03/ 
court_spilt_widens_over_whethe.html.  
11
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nation of whether the Act protects the CMI in question would require 
an inquiry into the exact process used to create the CMI as well as the 
process used to alter it. For example, CMI such as copyright 
information digitally embedded into an image’s metadata may be 
protected if a wholly digital process was used in its subsequent 
transformation under fair use, but not if the work was altered by a 
manual or analog process (e.g., a physical transformation of a 
physical print without visible CMI).49
 
 This approach would empha-
size the method by which the CMI was altered or removed, rather 
than by inquiry into whether CMI was removed at all. 
D.  Effects on CMI Process Owners 
 
The courts also have not clarified whether CMI conveyance 
dependent on external process is also protected, and whether those 
processes must be preserved in subsequent redistribution of the 
protected work. Only one case, Jacobsen v. Katzer, has commented 
on the matter.50 Jacobsen involved two model train hobbyists, both of 
whom created software frameworks for controlling model train 
behavior. The plaintiff, who sold the software commercially, filed a 
multifaceted suit against the defendant, who, under an open-source 
license, created software that functionally overlapped with the 
plaintiff’s software. In ruling on the plaintiff’s copyright claims, the 
Jacobsen court noted in dicta that under §1202, if an automated 
process is used to imprint CMI in software source code, that process 
or another like it must retain the original CMI for subsequent 
impressions.51
Such an interpretation of the CMI provisions may have significant 
 The court also noted that accidental CMI omission 
might be a violation of § 1202 if the omission takes place via inten-
tional secondary means that unintentionally remove the CMI. For 
example, if a protected piece of software relies on third-party 
software both to embed CMI and provide a critical function to the 
parent software, § 1202 may be violated if that third-party application 
is replaced with another to enhance the non-CMI function it provides 
but no longer conveys the attached CMI.  
                                                                                                         
49  See, e.g., Fred von Lohmann, supra note 45. 
50  Jacobsen v. Katzer, 93 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1236 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
51  Id. at 1242-43. 
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implications for CMI-generating process owners, such as software 
manufacturers. Creators of CMI-generating processes may be forced 
to give their process, or details about that process, away if a non-
original party adapts the work it protects. Both Jacobsen and the 
statute itself are silent as to whether the owner or licensor of the CMI 
imprinting mechanism is entitled to compensation if § 1202 mandates 
its inclusion. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Though § 1202 and CMI have historically been a minor 
component in litigation involving the sweeping Act, some recent 
court cases have tended to broaden the reach of CMI protection. A 
broad interpretation of § 1202 will increase the availability of stat-
utory damages, alter copyright balance toward the right’s owners, and 
affect related trademark law. If courts continue to trend toward 
broader § 1202 interpretation, they must be prepared to handle a 
much larger volume of cases posing Act and derivative claims. In 
addition, litigants must consider several novel effects of CMI doctrine 
when formulating their copyright complaints or defenses. 
 
PRACTICE POINTERS 
 
 Advise clients to document current CMI conveyance and propa-
gation processes. The clearer the connection between the CMI 
and the underlying work’s protection scheme is made, the more 
likely the CMI itself is to be protected. 
 Copyright owners should ensure that any copyright information 
placed on a protected work clearly falls into one of § 1202’s eight 
defined CMI categories. 
 Fully develop copyright-infringement claims before attempting to 
assert a CMI claim, because the latter is dependent on the former. 
 To mitigate legal exposure, advise clients intending to manipulate 
or integrate copyrighted works under fair use to only remove as 
much embedded CMI as is necessary. Remind clients that fair use 
is only a defense and not necessarily a deterrent to litigation. 
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